

UNDERSTANDING AS CREATING NARRATIVE STRUCTURES

(THE CONCEPT OF "WORLD" IN A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION)

Antal Bókay

Janus Pannonius University, Pécs

Introduction

It is natural that the researcher of the narrative tries to define first what it is he is interested in. But the concept of narrative in the semiotic and literary sciences is hopelessly vague and confused. The theories springing from different aspects have arrived at different basic concepts on such a wide scale that integration between them is impossible. The traditional aspect of "Literaturwissenschaft" treats the concept as a particular aspect of the theory of genre, and leaves it on a rather abstract, non-operative level. This means that instead of a theory, a critical survey of the epic, or more generally the novel is produced (Lubbock, 1921; Forster, 1927; Scholes-Kellog, 1966). Leaving aside this trend in research, there are probably two aspects of investigation left. The first takes the narrative as a special communication about reality, as a fiction that represents possible actions in human life. The linguistical form for this approach bears no central importance. In this group there can be found as different works as the structuralist study of Propp (1928) and the aesthetic approach of G. Lukács (1947).

According to the other tendency the narrative is a linguistic form, a very complex organization of the action discourse and its basic definitions can be given by logic and linguistics (for fictional vs, linguistic definitions see: Gray, 1975).

It seems to me that in consequence of the development of textlinguistics and other disciplines (semantics, logic, psycholinguistics etc.) in the study of semiotic objects it is possible to unite the two approaches of the fictional and linguistical definitions. In my paper - with a starting-point of the study of literature - I shall try to show some possible features of this model of narrative or, more generally speaking, of literary text theory. From the short history of the science of literature (if such exists at all) it is clear that metatheoretical orientations must be given more importance than anywhere else in the social sciences. These *a priori* assumptions are definitive and by leaving them unconscious the framework of investigation is limited (see: Schmidt, 1973; Dijk, 1979). This is the reason why I shall first try to give the metatheoretical assumptions of my study, and deduce the model of investigation only after that.

#### Aspects of investigation

It was stated first in semiotics, in the most general science of signs and sign systems that its object of inquiry can be investigated from three different aspects (Morris, 1938, 77-137.). The well-known aspects were summarised by Montague according to the following definition: "syntax is concerned solely with relations between linguistic expressions; semantics with relations between expressions and the objects to which they refer; and pragmatics with relations among expressions, the object to which they refer and the users or contexts of use of the expressions (Montague, 1968, 102. and Petőfi, 1977, 122.) Because of some categories gaining in importance later in this paper I would add one more original definition to the concept of pragmatics: "By pragmatics is designated the science of the relations of signs to their interpreters" (Morris, 1938, 108). The definition of Montague is acceptable only as a starting point,

bearing in mind the problems Petőfi has shown (1977, 119-149.). Montague's definition and Petőfi's treatment deals with the "syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects as always interwoven with each other" (Petőfi, 1977. 127.). In the original definitions however it is also easy to find a hierarchy of the three. According to Carnap in the same volume "pragmatical observations are the basis of all linguistic research" (Carnap, 1938, 147.). The hierarchy ordered according to a scheme where the first and basic element is the pragmatic, semantics comes next, and the last one syntax. Together they comprise the totality of the study of semiosis.

The sequence of the three aspects has shown the reverse order in the course of development in linguistics. The three categories - after the early abstract conception - represent the development of the science of linguistics, those paradigms (Kuhn, 1962) that were used by researchers to treat a part of human reality. The aspects of investigation of semiotic objects represent important metatheoretical phases according to the process by which they have become the definitive aspects of an empirical science. The three phases seem to me to show a line of development in the social sciences as well. W. Iser has provided a framework for this with the discussion of three categories of structure, function and communication (Iser, 1979). The investigator of the structure starts from a given whole, tries to analyse the elements of this totality and that system of rules that organizes them (the binary oppositions for example). In the case of a functionalist approach the structure loses its priority and is defined by its role in the context. The primary extratextual relation of the semiotic object is the meaning, the relation of the structure to the referred. The "function concept designates the relationship between text and extratextual realities and the meaning of the structures

within the text is revealed through their intended application" (Iser, 1979, 12.). We can find some parallel in the development of paradigms in the linguistics and the trend shown by Iser. The definition of semantics by Morris is clearly parallel with the function concept in that both take as central the intensional reference of the structure to something other. Linguistical semantics - as opposed to the syntactical-structuralist period - put the formal theory of meaning in the centre. The limitation of the semantical aspect lies in the fact that it fixes, and objectivates the text function into the sign object. It explains only the production of the meaning which is understood as a static property of the sign object. The semantical aspects explains the moment of the *genesis* of meaning but cannot give an explanation about the continuous *validity* of it (the two terms are from Iser, 1979.). The category of validity is clearly a pragmatical concept, it shows the point of view of realization, the use of the text. So as a summary, the syntactical aspect concentrates on the taxonomical, inner system, its paradigm was the first step of the systematic understanding of the semiotic process in linguistics. The semantical aspect deals with the expression-referent, the text/world relation. At last the pragmatic aspect integrates the other two into the text/reader relation. I would only note now the hierarchical system of the three paradigms is very close to the theory of Jürgen Habermas. According to him the human understanding of the world is directed by three research motivating interests. These are basic epistemological orientations as well. The three interests are the *technical*, that tries to understand the inner mechanism of the object of knowledge, the *hermeneutical* investigates the meaning, the genesis and the *emancipatorical* that is the role of understanding in human progress, the validity of knowledge for us (Habermas, 1968. Radnitzky, 1968; Wellmer, 1976).

Metatheoretical Problems of Pragmatical Theory of Narrative

If our aim is to understand narrative texts it is clear that we should choose the pragmatic approach, because this is the only one that can integrate the other two. The concept of pragmatics however, in its practical use, has not been converted into a unified aspect such as can be shown by the metatheoretical conception. In most cases- for the sake of formal treatment - The pragmatic aspect is reduced, the instrument of the scientific explanation (the formal apparatus) reduces the scope and content of the explanation (see Ferrara, 1977. on Montague and Bar-Hillel). The most general and widely accepted definition of this kind is stated by Stalnaker: "pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed" (1972, 383.). But the theory of the context and of speech acts makes up only a part of pragmatics. It interprets the productive forces of language use but it can give only abstract maxims for the understanding process, it is limited to the definition of the text/world level.

The autonomous text however in an ontological sense. has two extratextual constituents: its producer and its receiver. An essential characteristic feature of the two constituents is their definite inequality: the production is always momentary, objectivated, genetical, the subjective element is limited. These features enable the student to use formal means of description. The other constituent, the receiving and understanding, is always a process, organised around the validity and the subjective element plays an important role in this part of the ontological position. In this case where the repeated act of understanding is the central element there is only one possible basic category of pragmatics that is *interpretation*.

The proposed metatheoretical construction of the theory of narrative can be built up from the following ordered problems:

- *pragmatical level* - its basic problem is the interpretation of the narrative, the theory of validity based on the relation between text/reader
- deduced from the previous level, the next thing is the *semantical*, describing the general problems of text/world relation, the fictionality and the reference
- the next step in the deduction is the *syntactical* level, that produces the theory of the relations of the constitutive elements of the narrative.


The hierarchical construction of the levels together with their interwovenness are the basic feature of the system. The relative ineffectuality in linguistic methods in the theory of literature - compared to their empirical, scientific value - seems to me to result from the fact that a linguistic theory of pragmatics in this widest interpretative sense is still missing. The semantic and syntactic methods in themselves seem to be "imported methodologies" (Petőfi, 1980.) for the related fields in the semiotic studies.

It is clear that with the question of interpretation in the centre the minimal linguistical utterance investigated is the *text*. In the case of the syntactical or semantical aspects it is possible to investigate separated sequences. The relation between the reader and text however can be realized only in the case of whole, complete utterances. In defining the theory of interpretation we must start from this maximally complex semiotic object.

#### A Model for Investigating Narrative - the Concept of World

Based on the metatheoretical considerations we can state the model of investigation of the narrative. This seemingly very simple model fixes the mode of being, the basic ontological system of complex texts. All those texts

are produced and understood by somebody. They are intentional, that is they refer to something that is called here, for the sake of simplicity, reality.



The elements are in a reflexive relationship with each other, that is they mutually define each other. The investigation of the semiotic object often leaves aside one or other of the elements in this system. This can be accepted only as a provisional abstraction of the scientific research. The three aspects reviewed in the previous parts appear in this model with some simplification in the following from: The syntactical aspect gives the analysis of the delimited TEXT; the semantical interpretes the AUTHOR—TEXT—REALITY system; and the pragmatival starts from the READER—TEXT—REALITY relations. The last one necessarily takes the other two as its elements. The whole system can be defined - with the help of philosophical terms - as the ontological starting point for the epistemology of semiotic objects.

According to our pragmatival point of view we should build up our theory of narrative on the problem of interpretation. It is a consequence of the model that we assume that the reader projects a special reality based on the text. The text is an intentional structure produced by the author. The question is whether there is any general structure of understanding that is common to the reader and the text and defines their encounter. Several disciplines of the social sciences have recently defined this phenomenon. Behind the terms like "frame", "science", "world", "schemata", there is a common principle that our mental apparatus uses a technique of perception that evaluates the data from the outside world not as simple facts but according to a prior, inter-

pretative mental structure. It is also clear that the text or a special group of texts, where we can find the narratives as well, take the same principle as the inner organization of their structure.

The earliest conception of this thought was given by Gregory Bateson (1955). Bateson, realizing the independent feature of some forms of communication, tried to describe the logic of the metacommunicative process that was in charge with the independency from the actual world. He showed that the frame is a complex communicative technique that is a special mode of storing and activating information about the world. Its function is that it separates from the very complex and hardly understandable processes of the world those phenomenon, those situations that are important to be understood or imitated. The social psychological elaboration of Bateson's theory was developed by E. Goffman (1974). According to him, the frame can be defined as the 'principles of organization which govern events and our subjective involvement' (Goffman, 1974. 10.). Fillmore summarizes the frame concept of Bateson and Goffman as they "refer to an analytical framework within which human experience can be made intelligible" (Fillmore, 197 , 130).

#### World theories - Subjectivity of the Self-sufficient Text

It seems to me that the theories that can be used in the study of a literary work can be divided into three groups: the logical-semantical, the semiotical and the cognitive science theories. Without any detailed presentation or discussion I would like to emphasize only those points which may have decisive importance in a theory of narrative from a pragmatic aspect.

A trend around the term "possible world" investigated the phenomenon from a logical-semantical point of view. Its primary aim has been to give an adequate logical representa-



tion of the propositional attitudes, the counterfactuals and the impersonal intensional contexts. Most of the formulations do not give more than a logical instrument: "the semantic theory treats the spaces of entities and possible worlds as bare undifferentiated sets having no structure whatever" (Thomason, 1974, 50.). The undoubtedly most important theory world born of logical-semantic orientation is the work of Hintikka (1969; 1973; 1975). It is very important in the sense that he tried to give a consistent philosophical and epistemological definition of the possible world concept. Besides analyzing the mechanism of meaning production he sketches the general philosophical consequences giving the bases of a now non-positivistic theory of representation. He also introduces those results that were provided by cognitive psychology in the study of perception. The simplified essence of his system is that the "concepts, as meaning, are according to possible world semantics functions from possible worlds to references (extensions)" (Hintikka, 1975, 207.). The possible world is a mental system that mediates the reality reference of the meaning and so puts an end to the immediate connection of the meaning and reference. The basic element, the "raw material" of human meaning production processes is the possible world. The intentionality and intentionality are also connected by the principle of possible world such as the idea that intentionality is an intensional, inner conceptual construction of the mental arrangement of the extensional reality. Compared with phenomenology this new solution of the category of intention leads to the explanation of an important problem in epistemology. The principle of intentionality as intensionality, that is a "concept is intentional if and only if it involves the simultaneous consideration of several possible states of affairs or courses of events" (Hintikka, 1975, 195.), gives a semantical-epistemological explanation for the fact of how the human being

is capable of departing from the immediate, actual reality and able to think about it by the help of the modalities of real-possible. Hintikka - according to his aims - investigates two basic problems in connection with the possible worlds: firstly the relation of individuals and the world, where he proves the world to be primary to individuals. Secondly, he investigates the problem of the relations between worlds, the problem of the identifiable individuals in different possible worlds. He has not dealt with the inner construction of the worlds because according to his epistemological conception he tries to clarify the general principles of meaning production and reference. He has not dealt with the mechanism of interpretation. the analysis of the linguistically presented world. However from the point of view of narrative this can also be necessary so it would be useful to deduce the problem of world in such a reversed way even if it were strange from the point of view of logical semantics. So now I would like to move to a special narrativical, textlinguistical pragmatics based on the general thesis of Hintikka...

The reason why he has not dealt with the inner structure of the world can possibly be twofold. Firstly because he "brackets" it as a mental phenomenon that has been proved by psychology and tries to give the explanation of the logical relations of the individuals in a given arrangement. Secondly because the expressions analysed have an elementary nature and render it possible to restrict the analysis to the attitude and the possible world. It is probable, however, that the attitude has not only a mental representation, but that this subjective relation organises the system of relation of individuals delimited. This is a problem of the inner construction of the possible world. Even a simple belief utterance must be coherent in some way if it wants to be possible and so to be a world. If we start from the point of view of interpretation it is clear that the differ-

ent text-types and the different speakers create the possible world in different ways. According to my hypothesis the difference lies in the textual or other objectification of the intentionality, of the subjective organizing factor. Hintikka has shown that, although the possible worlds are not "natural things", "they may be as solidly objective as houses or books, but they are as certainly as these created by man (however unwittingly) for the purpose of facilitating their transactions with the reality they have to face" (Hintikka, The characteristic features of objectivation in the case of different texts can be very different. Certain texts are connected strongly with the situation of the creation, because to source of intentionality is a subject in a special situation. It is possible that the situation and the subject are not objectivated linguistically and the utterance, or the written text, while departing from the situations, loses its possible-world feature and the reader is not able to give it reality reference. On the other hand there are utterances that are able to fix linguistically these relations which objectivate the possible world needed for the understanding of the different elements or individuals. The characteristic feature of these texts is that they are self-sufficient. So we can speak of the *extrinsical* and *intrinsical* organization of the text-world. In the first case the world is organised upon a social or personal communicative situation. The adequate interpretation of the text is possible only in this situation and we need extratextual knowledge for the understanding. According to Paul Ricoeur these texts are organised in the *Umwelt* and not in the *Welt* and they have only ostensive reference (Ricoeur, 1973). By intrinsical textorganisation I mean that the world is inherent in the text, its reference understandable in itself. This is the principle of intentionality as intensionality projected to the whole text. The linguistic utterance in this case is

generally longer than the sentence and always functions as a text. The fact however that an utterance may consist of several sentences and so is a text would not mean that it has a world with an intrinsic organization (Eco, 1978. 29.).

Cognitive Science and the Narrative World - a Metatheoretical Note

Although the extension of the possible world concept to the text, the introduction of the interpretative aspect and the concept of an interpreter would not lead to the reduction of the world concept to mere analogy, it is clear that in this direction the strict logical development of the concept is not possible. There is no such logical theory at hand that would explain the macrostructures of complex texts and no such formalizable theory of language which can account for the ability of the speaker/hearer to produce and understand text. Another branch of the social sciences nevertheless puts this feature in the centre of interest.

Cognitive psychology and research in artificial intelligence are trying to investigate the process of *understanding* from the point of view of cognitive factors, contextual parameters, and the formation of algorithmically explicit programmes respectively (Dijk, 1980, 3.).

In the theory of narrative text both can be used only indirectly. Cognitive psychology has given new insights about the macro-systems of the mental processes of representation and memory. At this point text theory can go on showing how these phenomena are represented in the text, in its inner structure, in the mechanism of reference and interpretation. In the opposite way the research into artificial intelligence has given new information about the analysis and processing of texts. Here the task of a text theory is to make general the consequences deriving from particular aspects.

To go back to my earlier methateoretical thoughts I there is a clear difference between the concept of *structure* and *world*.

The "frame" or "world" is not the objective inner system of relations of a phenomenon, it is not a static taxonomically once-and-for all describable structure but a relational concept. Its existence is based on a relation, it is constituted in the relation of an interpreter subject and a verbal object. To refer back to Iser's proposal (Iser, 1979.) in a somewhat modified manner, the special category of the third phase in the scientific development will be the *world* and the *frame*. The structure concept explains a phenomenon as an objective inner system of relations; the function concept defines the relations of this intrinsical object to its context; the world explains the mutuality of the existence of the context and the intrinsic structure as a subject/object reflective relation. In the case of this category the linguistic set of elements is *structured*, has a *function*, and is *acquired* by an interpreter. These relational features introduced by this category can clearly work only in the actual text production and understanding processes. Scientific explanation disrupts this unity, because in the case of the interpretative process the objective linguistical facts and structures appear first. These can be the bases for deducing the meaning, and finally for building up the abstract general system, the world.

From the point of view of interpretation the text world is antecedent and consequent at the same time. It means that in the spontaneous understanding of the text the encounter of the whole text and the readers' frames (expectations, conventions etc.) defines the important structure and meaning elements. These in turn can help the thorough explanation of the abstract text world. Kuipers for example differentiates between the "global nature of description" and the "local nature of observation" (Kuipers, 1975, 156.) in the case of

text-frames. The first is the explanation of the text according to its world, the second is the description of the objective structure of elements.

As a summary of this part we can state that the *world* is a category of interpretation, an abstract system that comes from the rewriting of the concrete text in the proper subject/object relation.

### Explanation

Before analysing the inner structure of the text world, I would like to indicate some problems arising from our definition.

The first is noted by Fillmore in the following way: "What is needed in discourse analysis is a way of discussing the development, on the part of the interpreter, of an image, or scene or picture of the world as that gets built up and filled out between the beginning and the end of the text-interpretation experience" (Fillmore, 197, 125). This is the question of *explanation* of the abstract system in the case of a concrete text, or to put it another way: the problem of the possible ways of explication of the implicit text worlds. It seems that there are two general possibilities available. The first can be called *inductive*, the second *deductive*. The world can be separated from the text in that I describe the linear connections of the elements in the text. I assign a basic element- say the sentence - and try to find longer segments consisting of these elementary units. At last I arrive at the whole text. This is a very frequent way among theories of interpretation, but it has several problems. First the assignment of the basic units is always arbitrary and exterior to the text world. The individuals in the analysis are defined according to objective rules of a science, generally of logic, action theory or linguistics. This is a step back to the structuralist attitude because it tries to find the construc-

tion of the world in the objective phenomenon, the world is purely a consequence of the process, and the individuals in the world are primary to the world structure. The frame is specified in this way by Schank-Abelson (1977) and Schank Lebowitz (1980).

The other possible way of specification of the world is the construction of its parts from the whole. The starting point is the spontaneous understanding of the whole text. The specification of the individuals, the relations in the world and the explicit world structure is based on this process. The concrete process of understanding is always centered on the possible outcome, because it always assumes a possible world from the data received up to that moment. This expectation is continuously corrected in the course of reading and understanding. The explicit world of the text is an outcome of a matching process between the knowledge frames, the expectations of the reader and the objective relation-possibilities in the text. In the cognitive process research this phenomenon is called the "principle of continually available output" (Kuipers, 1975, 179).

### Translation

The other problem concerning the description of the abstract structure is the question of translation, or re-writing. The world appears in the text in concrete, united images. In the process of interpretation we have to translate these forms into another language according to the following minimal requirements:

- the translated and the translation should represent different levels of abstraction
- the outcome of the translation should be more abstract, or should have a conceptual nature (opposed to imagery)

- the outcome of the translation and the original is a one-many relationship
- the outcome of the translation is more systematical, more manageable and more operative
- the outcome of the translation is functionally preserving, that is it preserves every functionally important element from the original.

Translation is probably the most important and most complex problem of the theory of interpretation. In reality every semiotic theory, and this includes linguistic theory, contains an implicit theory of translation without the explicit analysis of its translation-nature. The syntactical use of the rewriting rule, or the system of semantic markers, is just as much translation as Fillmore's "case frame"-s (Fillmore, 1968; 197) or Dijk's macrostructures (Dijk, 1972). The translations can have a *formal* or *non-formal* nature. The first is developed by linguistics and logic in the syntactical and semantical treatment of semiotical objects. The second is the very old method of hermeneutics, the history of literature and philosophy, where the central interest is in the abstract structure of the content of the text, that objectivates human values, possible ways of life, etc. It can be hoped that pragmatics in the sense we have proposed would be wide enough to integrate the two approaches in a complex scientific processing of the texts.

### Metaphorisation

I would like to make only a brief reference to a problem which is surely too important to be discussed in a short paper. This is a hypothesis that we can talk about text reference or a special type of it, that operates on a different route than the reference of the utterances describing simple states. In the case of the "story" or a fictional text it is really very hard to apply the traditional



theory of reference. An interesting novelty in cognitive psychology nevertheless can be connected with our problem. According to this there are two types of memory: *remembering in imagery* and *remembering in propositions*. The first means that "some central mechanisms are generating a (probably sequential) pattern of information which corresponds more or less to the structural information in the original perception" (Bower, 1972, 58.). This special connection based on structural isomorphism is the principle of imitation. The text enables the interpretator to take its image content as structurally isomorphic with his own world, specifying some "frames" of his life. In the process the text-world becomes significant for the interpreter. The text-objectivating frame or world is able to produce some imagery or appearance and can give information without transforming it into a propositional type. If somebody interpreted the text, and shows the world inherent in the text for himself, than he would change the imagery information into a propositional kind. The two kinds of information cannot be completely translated into the propositional. The two kinds of information cannot be completely translated into each other - a well-known fact is that there is always something left after the translation (interpretation) of a literary text. A part of the above hypothesis is that the relation between the reader's frame and the concrete text, the one which produces the abstract world, is also considerably different from the usual text/reality relation in a *hic et nunc* situation. This connection can probably be investigated by elaborating the logic of *analogy*. The two types of remembering and the problem of analogy is explicitly connected by a pair of categories in Bobrow (1975, 31.). He uses the terms *analogical* versus *propositional representation*. Others have also shown these two knowledge types as *contingency shaped* and *rule-governed* (Baldwin-Baldwin, 1978.).

I have to mention another characteristic feature. The remembering in imagery is considerably *indefinite*, there are only some figures defined, all the others are indefinite background (Bower, 1972, 57.). The indefiniteness is a characteristic feature of the world as well, because the closed intensional text gives just as much information in the explanation as there is in the text. In the case of a normal reality reference there would be an immeasurable amount of information that can be gained to explain the given utterance. This seemingly insufficient feature frees the text from being fixed to the immediate empirical reality and enables many interpretators to connect many subjective frames to it. Here we find a strange situation: that it can be general without using abstract terms. This text seems to have a double meaning level. Firstly the utterances used refer to an immediate element of reality, secondly they take part in the construction of a general, abstract world that becomes explicit after interpretation. Certainly in the text not all the linguistic elements are capable of this. There are some central individuals that convey the world. These elements that were called "slots" by Minsky (1975) or IMPS by Winograd (1975) have a special position. From the point of view of literature we can say that they are special metaphors. The specialness comes from the fact that they show a metaphorizing process where in the tenor part of the metaphor is an abstract position, an element of the world, and the vehicle part is a concrete individual of an image. In the text they appear as descriptions of states and events, and their metaphorical character is not clear. Obviously they are not really metaphors, they are not a transference of names but the text has the extra task of representing a world. We are close here to the famous thesis of Roman Jakobson, that the poetic function is the shifting of the principle of selection to the axis of combination (Jakobson, 1960, 358.). The text-world uses this technique similar to

metaphorisation to separate its individuals from those elements of the text which are used only for giving background to the imagery. Of course this distinction depends on the interpretator as well, according to our principle of a pragmatic subject - object relation.

Text-types — the Concept of the Story

In particular these last thoughts refer only to a special class of texts: those that are highly organised and completely self-sufficient. In this group we can find all literary texts, but there are many texts in everyday life that show this level of complexity. The group of complex texts can be called stories, taking the term in a rather wider sense, and including lyrical poetry as well. The "story" is a linguistic utterance on the text level that has a world defining its coherence. Fillmore has shown the connection of coherence and world: "a text is coherent to the extent that its successive parts contribute to the construction of a single (possibly quite complex) scene" (Fillmore, 197, 127.). In this sense in the case of a text we can speak of one world that can be divided into sub-worlds with relative independence. The organization of a world like this shows an order of "nearly decomposable systems", where the subsystems in their immediate existence are relatively free, but they are built into the whole system indirectly (Simon, 1969, 100.; Winograd, 1975, 191.).

Another important feature of the story is mentioned by Dijk (1980, 13.). According to him the story is special in the sense that it has a "point" that is, after reading it we know why it has written. This psychological feature shows that the interpretator has recognized a text that is intrinsic, where there is no need of any situative, extensive reference for its understanding. The "point" is the core of the principle of world production, a spontaneously

felt unity, that unites the different elements and is used as a subjective organizing principle. This means that the text has come to be significant in the reader-text relation. Rumelhart refers to the same abstract core in texts when defines the story as a summarizable text (Rumelhart, 1975.).

### The World philosophy

Such features of the story throw light on the basic interpretative constituents of the text world. If we define the world as an *intensional system of relations that defines individuals as its elements*, then the "point" mentioned above seems to be a central constituent. The system of relations is primary in existence to the individuals. This is the force that takes the individuals as a unity, carries the principle of identity (that the individuals are the individuals of the same world) and gives the proper functions in the identity.

Philosophically it is a subjective phenomenon, a mental system that selects all the elements and gives special interpretation to them. In this sense Eco called the possible world "rational construct", and in a similar way Hintikka stresses the principle of intentionality as intensionality, the Kantian features of his theory, and the ideological feature of the the possible world (Hintikka, 1969.). As a constituent, I call this subjective core *world-philosophy*. It is a non-formal abstraction, the content producing the text coherence. This is the pure essence of the relations and the abstract common principle of these relations. The phenomena of the actual world can be ordered into levels of abstractness, because in any two phenomena there is an abstract identity common to both. The world philosophy is always that level of abstractness that is characteristic of the given text-world, but the most general one. Its description can be

adequately given with the help of the categories of philosophy. It always depends on the interpretator, first of all on the matching process between the mental frame and the text, and on the features of the reader's frame. It exists between the textual and extratextual just because it is only indirectly in the text and can be made explicit only with the help of interpretation. And because the individuals are possible concretizations of this abstract world-philosophy they take this abstractness in their concrete existence, the world-philosophy is the source of indefiniteness as well.

The world-philosophy works like the attitude part of the propositional attitude sentences, it defines the system of relations of the individuals. This system - in the case of stories - is always a complex organization on two levels of organization, *linear* and *non-linear*. This distinction can be found in several world theories. Saarinen refines, for example, the theory of Hintikka, differentiating between the possible state of affairs and the possible course of events. The second "is a class of linearly ordered states of events" the first is a "temporal slice in several different courses of events" and they have no future and no history (Saarinen, 1979, 191.). The role of this difference in Saarinen is that with its help is easier to show the two different ways of cross-identification based on continuity and similarity. Østen Dahl shows the same phenomenon from a model-theoretical aspect, differentiating between static and dynamic organization. "An ideal narrative discourse consists of two parts: a set of instructions for performing successive changes in that situation" (Dahl, 1977, 154.). The first means a static and spatial, the second a dynamic and temporal organization. In our system we shall call the linear organization *world-process*, the non-linear *world-structure*. The second is more basic, it shows the hierarchical

order of the individuals. Certain texts can exist without a world-process, without a temporal moment (such is lyrical poetry in literature). Of course the text is not able to state the world structure at once, so the text decomposes the simultaneous system into a linear string. The world-structure is a level of organization which is not as abstract as the world philosophy but it is not the linear order of concrete constituents. It is the world-philosophy realised in a concrete relation system. The world process has a linear organization, and refers to the functioning of the world. It shows those forms of movements which are the results of the dynamics of the individuals. The steps of the world process are always causal, they represent the abstract action structure of the narrative text.

### Individuals

According to our earlier definitions the elements of the text-world are the individuals. The expression should not be understood in its logical sense. Here the term individual means that the world philosophy and the world-structure-world-process are realized in concrete elements which are realized in concrete elements which are acceptable even in actual, empirical reality. The *individuals* are *those elements of the narrative, in which the world creating the text is manifested on the phenomenon level of the text*. The first problem is that in a narrative text a lot of constituents can appear which - from a logical point of view - can be the individuals in a proposition. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the narrative world they are not individuals. The theory of narrative would be hopelessly complex if it attempted to explain all the elements with linguistic objectivation. It is also clear that in the different text types the proportion of individuals and non-individuals is different. Moreover it is also clear that the non-individual

elements are necessary constituents of the text as well, because without them the individuals would be abstract figures without a background.

I take as individuals only those elements which fill in the empty spaces of the world structure. It is characteristic of their quality that they are always metaphorical in the earlier sense, they convey double information, an abstract content and an immediate appearance. The more general constituents of the text-world - analysed earlier - import the structure of reality into the text, and they give rewrite rules which change the empirical element to the position of an individual of the world. The indefiniteness mentioned earlier is the consequence of this rewrite process. In the process of abstraction such definitions, features of the individual which can be important in the actual world situation are often deleted.

If we consider the nature of the individuals in the narrative, an interesting analogy appears. According to this the individual is the morphological level of the narrative, the word of the sentence of the whole text. Eco for example analysed the individuals of the text as meaning units. It is definitive, however, what kind of semantic analysis we use for the description of the inner structure. In the case of an individual Eco collects those features which operate in it. The most important of these are the so-called diagnostic properties "allowing me to single out without ambiguity the class of individuals I am referring to within a contextual world" (Eco, 1978, 34.). Eco produces the feature elements inductively from the encyclopedic meaning and inserts these artificially produced elements into the system of the text. Our conception, however, says that the meaning assignment would not come from the construction of an artificially-produced encyclopedic meaning but from the constituents of the world. This process would be *deductive* because a general definition would get concrete groups of features. Without

trying to describe such a process I would like to show an alternative method of semantic description. Fillmore gives the semantic notion of *prototype* based on the results of cognitive psychology. The prototype theory of meaning presumes that "the understanding of meaning requires, at least for the great many cases, an appeal to an exemplar or prototype - this prototype being possibly something which, instead of being analysed, needs to be presented or demonstrated or manipulated". The alternative, widely used, theory of meaning is the "checklist theory" according to which 'the meaning of a linguistic form is represented in terms of a checklist of conditions that have to be satisfied' (Fillmore, 197 , 123.). It seems to me that the basic difference between the two types of theory is that the checklist theory renders the meaning independent from the user of the text and takes them as objective elements of the construction. The prototype theory defines the objective sign as the creative and created element of the subjectively-produced frame of the user.

If we try to use the prototype interpretation then in the case of the individuals in the text, the relations of the world structure, their abstract content would assign a prototype as the most general content of the individual. The text completes this general content with a minimal set of features for making the world appearing in its concrete form coherent on the level of imagery. It is probable that this complement is needed in the case of stories and literary works to give a sense of life to the text world.

To summarize: every individual has two groups of components: its *relations* and its *features*, where the first is definitive. The *features* are series of inherent, inner characteristics they are objectively given. At the genesis of the world these features present the individual as a possible alternative. At the same time they do not limit the



individual, because the features can be multiplied (infinitely). The features can be defined in the case of an individual as those definitions according to which the individual functions in the different worlds (actual and possible). The relation is external compared to the individual, and is not objectivated in it. It shows the prototype as the part of the system in a possible world. The features are potential, the relations are actual and realised. However the realations in the case of a given world actualize the features from the potential pool of features.

The conception about the inner structure of the world is a pragmatic conception, that is part of an interpretative process. This means that the listing of the constituents would not mean a narrative syntax, but some syntactical consequences of the theory of understanding.

#### References

- Bach, E. and Harms, R. (eds.) 1968. Universals in Linguistic Theory. Holt, Rinehart, New York
- Baldwin, I.D. and Baldwin, I.I. 1978. Behaviorism on Verstehen and Erklären. Am Soc. Rev. 1978: vol. 43. 335-347.
- Bateson, G. 1955. A Theory of Play and Phantasy. In: Steps to an Ecology of Human Mind. 1973. Paladin, New York, 150-166.
- Bobrow, D. G. 1975. Dimensions of Representation. In: Dobrow-Collins 1975: (eds.): 1-34.
- Bower, G. H. 1972. Mental Imagery and Associative Learning In: Gregg, 1972. 51-88.

- Carnap, R. 1938. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. In: Neurath-Carnap-Morris (eds.) 1938: 139-214.
- Cogen, C., Thompson, H., Thurgood, G., Whistler, K. and Wright, J. (eds.) 1965. Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics society. Univ. of California, Berkeley.
- Dahl, Ö. (ed.) 1977. Logic, Pragmatics and Grammar. Univ. of Göteborg.
- Dijk, T. A. van, 1972. Some Aspects of Text Grammars. The Hague: Mouton.
- Dijk, T. A. van, 1979. Advice on Theoretical Poetics. Poetics, vol. 8. no. 6. 569-608.
- Dijk, T. A. van, 1980. Story Comprehension: An Introduction Poetics, 9, 1980: 1-21.
- Eco, U. 1978. Possible Worlds and Text Pragmatics, Versus, 1978. 19/20.
- Eco, U. 1979. The Role of the Reader. Indiana Univ. Bloomington.
- Ferrara, A. 1977. A Few Considerations on a Pragmatic Component. Versus 16/3. 49-70.
- Fillmore, Ch. 1968. The Case for Case. In: Bach-Harms, 1968: 1-90.
- Fillmore, Ch. 1965. An Alternative to Checklist Theories of Meaning. In: Cogen et al. (eds.)
- Forster, E. M. 1927. Aspects of the Novel. Penguin, Middlesex 1970.
- Gibson, I.I. 1966. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Houghton Mifflin, Boston
- Goffman, E. 1974. Frame Analysis. Peregrine Book, Penguin 1975.

- Gray, B. 1975. *The Phenomenon of Literature*. Mouton, The Hague.
- Gregg, L. W. (ed.) 1972. *Cognition in Learning and Memory*. Wiley, New York.
- Habermas, I. 1968. *Knowledge and Human Interest*. Beacon Press, N.Y.
- Hintikka, J. 1969. *Models for Modalities*. Reidel, Bordrecht
- Hintikka, J. 1973. *Logic, Language-Games and Information*. Oxford Univ. London.
- Hintikka, J. 1974. *The Intentions of Intentionality*. D. Reidel, Dordrecht
- Iser, W. 1979. *The Current Situation is Literary Theory*. New Literary History vol. IX. No. 1. 1-21.
- Jakobson, R. 1960. *Concluding Statement Linguistics and Poetics*. In: *Style in Language* (ed.) Th. Sebeok the M. I. T. Press 350-377.
- Kuhn, Th. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Kuipers, B. I. 1975. *A Frame for Frame*. In: Bobrow-Collins, 1975: (eds.) 151-184.
- Lubbock, P. 1921. *The Craft of Fiction*. Jonathan Cape, London.
- Lukács, G. 1947. *The Historical Novel*. London, Merlin Press
- Minsky, M. 1975. *A Framework for Representing Knowledge*. In: Winston, 1975.
- Montague, R. 1968. *Pragmatics*. In: R. Klibensky (ed.): *La philosophie contemporaine I*. Firenze, La Nuova Italia
- Morris, Ch. 1938. *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*. In: Neurath-Carnap-Morris, 1938: 77-138.

- Neurath, O., Carnap, R. and Morris, Ch. 1938. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science vol. 1. The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Petöfi, J. S. 1977. Semantics, Pragmatics, Text Theory. PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature, vol. 2. 119-149.
- Propp, V. 1928. Morphology of the Folktale. Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press
- Radnitzky, G. 1968. Contemporary Schools of Metascience Akademiförlaget, Göteborg
- Rantala, V. 1979. Possible Worlds and Formal Semantics. In: Saarinen et al 1979: (eds.) 177-188.
- Riccœur, P. 1973. The Model of the Text. New Literary History vol. V. no. 1. 91-117.
- Rumelhart, D.E. 1975. Notes on a Schema for Stories. In: Bobrow-Collins, 1975: 211-236.
- Saarinen, E. 1979. Continuity and Similarity in Cross-Identification. In: Saarinen et al. 1979. (eds.)
- Saarinen et al (eds.) 1979. Essays in Honour of J. Hintikka D. Reidel, Dordrecht
- Schank-Abelson. 1977: Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding Hillsdale, N.I.: Erlbaum
- Schank-Lebowitz. 1980. Levels of Understanding in Computers and People. Poetics, 9. 1980: 251-273.
- Schmidt, S. I. 1973. On the Foundation and Research Strategies of a Science of Literary Communication. Poetics, 7., 7-35.
- Scholes, R. and Kellogg, R. 1966. The Nature of Narrative Oxford Univ. Press

- Simon, H. 1969. The Sciences of the Artificial. M.I.T. Press.
- Stalnaker, R. 1972. Pragmatics. In: Davidson, D. and Harman, G.: Semantics of Natural Language. 380-397. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland.
- Thomason, R. 1974. Introduction. In: Montague, 1974. Formal Philosophy. Yale Univ. New Haven.
- Winograd, T. 1975. Frame Representation. In: Bobrow-Collins 1975. (eds.) 185-210.
- Winston, P. (ed.) 1975. The Psychology of Computer Vision McGraw Hill, New York.
- Wellmer, A. 1976. Communications and Emancipation. In: O'Neill, J. (ed.) On Critical Theory, Heinemann, 1976.